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Antitrust
by Michael Eric Ross*
and
Jeffrey S. Cashdan'"
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals published only four antitrust
decisions in 1997.' Two of these cases were decided on procedural
grounds2 and two on substantive grounds.3 Once again, defendants
prevailed in most of these cases, including an action brought by the
Government to enjoin an acquisition.
I.

PROCEDURAL DECISIONS

Nonappealabilityof Denial of Motion to Dismiss Based on the
McCarran-FergusonAct
In Jordan v. Avco Financial Services, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit
considered whether the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the
McCarran-Ferguson Act 5 is reviewable on interlocutory appeal pursuant
A.

* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Florida (A.B.,
1971); Harvard University (J.D., 1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. Claremont McKenna
College (BMA, 1987); University of Chicago (J.D., 1990). Member, State Bars of Georgia
and Illinois.
The views expressed in this Article are personal opinions of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of King & Spalding or any of its clients.
1. United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 1997); Jordan v. Avco
Fin. Servs., Inc., 117 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1997); Retina Assocs., P.A. v. Southern Baptist
Hosp., Inc., 105 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 1997); Florida Seed Co. v. Monsanto Co., 105 F.3d
1372 (11th Cir. 1997).
2. Jordan,117 F.3d 1254 (denial of motion to dismiss based on McCarran-Ferguson Act
not appealable under collateral order doctrine); Florida Seed, 105 F.3d 1372 (affirming
dismissal for lack of standing).
3. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302 (affirming denial of motion for permanent
injunction); Retina Assocs., 105 F.3d 1376 (affirming grant of summary judgment).
4. 117 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1997).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
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Plaintiffs, consumers in credit
to the collateral order doctrine.'
transactions, alleged that defendants fraudulently induced them to
purchase "nonfiling insurance" to protect against losses that merchants
and financial institutions might incur as a result of failing to file a Form
UCC-1, which would perfect a security interest in items plaintiffs
purchased on credit.' Plaintiffs alleged that this nonfiling insurance in
fact was an undisclosed finance charge, not insurance.' Plaintiffs filed
a purported class action alleging violations of the Sherman Act,9 the
Clayton Act, 0 the Truth in Lending Act,"' and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act.12 Defendants moved to dismiss
the complaint, contending that the product sold to plaintiffs was
insurance, that the dispute was covered by state insurance law, and that
defendants thus were immunized from liability by the McCarranFerguson Act on issues concerning the business of insurance. 3 The
district court denied that motion, as well as defendants' motion to certify
the order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)."4
Defendants, nonetheless, filed an appeal. A motion panel of the
Eleventh Circuit initially denied plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the district court's denial of the
motion to dismiss was immediately appealable based on the collateral
order doctrine." A subsequent merits panel of the Eleventh Circuit,
however, vacated the motion panel's order and dismissed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction. 6
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the collateral order doctrine does
not apply to the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the McCarran-

6. Id. at 1255. The collateral order doctrine, first announced in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), provides a "narrow exception" to the normal
rule requiring a final judgement before an appeal may be taken. The doctrine is limited
to orders that (1) conclusively determine (2) important legal questions that are (3)
completely separate from the merits of the underlying action and (4) are effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
7. Jordan,117 F.3d at 1255-56.
8. Id. at 1256.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1994).
10. Id. §§ 12-26 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
11. Id. §§ 1601-1677.
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
13. Jordan, 117 F.3d at 1255.
14. Id. at 1256.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1258. Eleventh Circuit Rule 27-1(f) provides that "[a] ruling on a motion or
other interlocutory matter, whether entered by a single judge or a panel, is not binding
upon the panel to which the case is assigned on the merits, and the merits panel may alter,
amend, or vacate it." 11TH CiR. R. 27-1(f).
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Ferguson Act. 7 The court recognized that questions of immunity may
be appealed interlocutorily because these issues are effectively unreviewable following final judgment."8 The court held, however, that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which exempts from federal antitrust and
certain other law the business of insurance to the extent it is regulated
by state law,' provides a pre-emption defense to liability rather than
a grant of immunity.2 0 The court concluded that the rejection of a preemption defense at the pleading stage could be reviewed effectively on
appeal from a final judgment. 21 For this reason, the court concluded
that the collateral order doctrine does not apply to orders denying
motions based on the McCarran-Ferguson Act.22 Accordingly, the court
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.'
B. Antitrust Standing
In Florida Seed Co. v. Monsanto Co. ,24 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of a Sherman Act claim based on the lack of antitrust
standing.25 In the Eleventh Circuit, antitrust standing involves a twopronged analysis of (1) "antitrust injury" and (2) whether the plaintiff is
an "efficient enforcer" of the antitrust laws (for example, not remotely
injured).26 Antitrust injury is "injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the
defendants' acts unlawful." 27 Accordingly, when a plaintiff's claimed
injury results simply from heightened competition or when the injury is
unrelated to the alleged antitrust violation
or to an adverse effect on
28
competition, there is no antitrust injury.

17. 117 F.3d at 1258.
18. Id. at 1257. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015. See generally Michael Eric Ross & Jeffrey S. Cashdan,
Antitrust, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1389, 1397-98 (1997).
20. Jordan, 117 F.3d at 1258.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 105 F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 1997).
25. Id. at 1373.
26. Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1449 (11th Cir. 1991).
27. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
28. Antitrust injury is required for all private claims brought pursuant to either section
4 (damages) or section 16 (injunctive relief) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a), 26. See
Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489 (claim for damages); Cargill v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S.
104 (1986) (claim for injunctive relief); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.. 495
U.S. 328 (1990) (claim for damages based on per se theory of liability).
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In Florida Seed the court focused on the antitrust injury element of
antitrust standing. The case involved a terminated distributor's
challenge to Monsanto's 1993 acquisition of Ortho, a lawn and garden
business.2 9 Prior to this acquisition, Florida Seed distributed and
marketed both Monsanto's and Ortho's lawn and garden products. After
the acquisition Monsanto terminated Florida Seed as an Ortho
distributor pursuant to a broad strategic decision to use fewer distributors. ° Florida Seed and its sole shareholder, Frit Industries ("Frit"),
filed suit, alleging that Florida Seed's termination was part of Monsanto's plan to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the residential
nonselective herbicide market in part by damaging the value of the
trademark of an Ortho product ("Kleenup") that was to be divested
pursuant to a consent decree with the Federal Trade Commission.31
The district court dismissed the action for lack of standing.32
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.33 First, the court explained that
Florida Seed's only injury, termination as a distributor, does not qualify
as antitrust injury.34 The complaint failed to allege an anticompetitive
impact on consumers-higher price or lower output-that flowed from
the injury Florida Seed purportedly suffered from its termination as an
Ortho distributor.35 As the Eleventh Circuit explained, the mere
termination of a distributor, by itself, is insufficient to demonstrate
harm to competition. 36 Because Florida Seed alleged only injury to
itself, and not to consumers as a whole, Florida Seed failed to plead
antitrust
injury. Thus, dismissal of the antitrust claims was appropri37
ate.

29. FloridaSeed, 105 F.3d at 1373.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Florida Seed Co. v. Monsanto Co., 915 F. Supp. 1167 (M.D. Ala. 1995), aft'd, 105
F.3d 1372 (11th Cir. 1997).
33. Florida Seed, 105 F.3d at 1376.
34. Id. at 1374.
35. Id.
36. Id. Other circuit courts of appeal agree. For example, the court in Rutman Wine
Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 735 (9th Cir. 1987), commented:
A termination is not unlawful because of some adverse effect on the distributor's
business, even if the effect is the elimination of the distributor from the market.
The complaining distributor must show that the refusal to deal was intended to
or did bring about some restraint of trade beyond the loss of business suffered by
the distributor or the market's loss of a distributor-competitor.
37. In dicta the court further held that Florida Seed would be an inefficient enforcer
of the antitrust laws because its injuries, if any, were remote from harm to consumers in
the relevant market. 105 F.3d at 1374.
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The court likewise rejected for lack of antitrust standing the claims of
Frit, Florida Seed's sole shareholder and the guarantor of its debt.-"
Frit was neither a competitor nor a consumer in the relevant market.3"
Because Frit's only injury, if any, derived from its capacity as Florida
Seed's shareholder
and guarantor, the court held that Frit also lacked
40
antitrust injury.
II.

SUBSTANTIE DECISIONS

A.

Retina Associates, PA. v. Southern Baptist Hospital
Retina Associates, PA. v. Southern Baptist Hospital4 1 addressed an
antitrust challenge to a joint venture of eye care physicians. Plaintiff
Retina Associates ("RA") is a Florida corporation located in Jacksonville
that specializes in the diagnosis and treatment of diseases of the retina
and vitreous.42 General opthamologists typically refer patients with
specific retina problems to retina specialists. Thus, when certain
individual defendant opthamologists decided to form a full service
opthamology practice at a major hospital, there was a perceived need to
include a retina specialist practice in the venture.' Certain of the
individual defendants invited RA to join them in forming the Baptist Eye
Institute ("BEI") to be located on the campus of the Baptist Medical
Center, the largest acute care hospital in Jacksonville. 4 RA turned the
invitation down twice. 4 Ultimately, after some initial reluctance,
defendant Florida Retina Institute ("FRI"), another retina specialist
practice, joined BEI.46 As a result, all or most of the retina service
referrals of BEI's general opthamologists went to FRI, not RA. 4' The
parties estimated that the referrals from BEI's opthamologists to retina
specialists accounted for only fifteen percent of the total retina referrals
made in the relevant geographic market (the Jacksonville area) during
the relevant period.'

38. Id. at 1375-76.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 105 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 1997).
42. Id. at 1378-79.
43. Id. at 1379.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1379-80.
Id. at 1379.
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Upset at having lost access to the referrals from BEI's opthamologists,
RA filed suit alleging (1) that BEI's exclusive referral arrangement
constituted a horizontal concerted refusal to deal or group boycott in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and (2) that FRI attempted to
monopolize the retina services market by entering into the exclusive
referral arrangement in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.49
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on both
counts, holding that there was no basis in law or fact for either claim.5
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, expressly adopting in full the reasoning
of the district court."'
First addressing the section 1 claim, the district court rejected
application of the per se rule of illegality because of the lack of precedent
suggesting the arrangement at issue harmed competition and because
BEI's physicians, who controlled only fifteen percent of the referrals for
retina services, lacked economic power in the alleged relevant market for
retina services referrals.5" The court correctly determined that RAs
section 1 claims instead should be judged by the rule of reason, pursuant
to which any substantially anticompetitive effects of the restraint at
issue are balanced against the restraint's procompetitive effects."3 Rule
of reason analysis was particularly appropriate in this case given that
BEI appeared to be an efficiency-enhancing joint venture and that the
referral restraint seemed to have been reasonably related to achieving
those integrative efficiencies.54

49. Id. at 1380. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
50. 105 F.3d at 1380.

51. Id. at 1378. The district court opinion is reproduced in full as an appendix to the
Eleventh Circuit decision.
52. Id. at 1381-83. The district court considered defendants' collective market power
in connection with the per se analysis in an attempt to comply with the Supreme Court's
directive in Northwest Wholesale Stationers,Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & PrintingCo., 472
U.S. 284, 296 (1985), which held that the per se rule should only apply in the group boycott
context when the group at issue possesses "market power or exclusive access to an element
essential to effective competition," See also F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447, 458 (1986) ("[The per se approach has generally been limited to cases in which firms
with market power boycott suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from doing
business with a competitor ..... ).
53. 105 F.3d at 1381. See generally Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918).

54. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The district court mentioned
the ancillariness of the restraint on referrals solely in noting that the venture's restraints

are not immune from antitrust liability. Retina Assocs., 105 F.3d at 1380 n.4. The district
court failed to recognize the importance of the ancillary restraint doctrine for purposes of
determining whether per se or rule of reason treatment is appropriate for the joint venture.
See, e.g., National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986)
(approving ancillary restraint of joint venture under rule of reason). See also U.S. Dep't
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Turning to the rule of reason, the district court quickly dispensed with
plaintiff's arguments.55 Under the rule of reason, structural proof of
market power, based on analysis of market share, entry barriers, and
other evidence, is not necessary when actual anticompetitive effects can
be shown." Thus, the district court initially considered plaintiff's
purported proof of alleged anticompetitive effects. 7 Plaintiff pointed
to the allegedly higher prices FRIs patients were paying for BEI
referred services compared to prices paid by patients of other retina
service providers." The district court properly rejected this argument,
observing that RA would benefit from any increase in the price of retina
services and consequently lacked standing to assert a claim.59 Also
noteworthy, though not discussed by the court, is the lack of evidence
that patients in the relevant market could not switch retina specialists
if FRI's prices were unreasonably high."
Having found no evidence of actual anticompetitive effects, the district
court considered structural proof of market power."1 Given BEI's small
fifteen percent share of the retina services referral market and the lack
of evidence of entry barriers, the district court correctly rejected
plaintiff's assertion that defendants collectively had the power to control
price and output. 2 Thus, the court held that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain a section 1 claim and granted summary judgment."

of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements Of Antitrust Enforcement Policy In Health
Care (1996), reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,153, at 20,800 (stating that federal
enforcement agencies generally will apply the rule of reason to joint ventures when there
is sufficient integration "to produce significant efficiencies [and] any agreements on price
fare] reasonably necessary to accomplish the venture's procompetitive benefits."). The
ancillary restraint doctrine for joint ventures usually is traced to then Judge Taft's opinion
in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd as modified,

175 U.S. 211 (1899).
55. Retina Assocs., 105 F.3d at 1383-85.
56. See IndianaFed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61 ("'(Plroof of actual detrimental
effects, such as a reduction of output' can obviate the need for an inquiry into market

power, which is but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects.'" Id. at 460-61 (quoting PHILLIP
E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION 1511, at 429 (1986))).
57. Retina Assocs., 105 F.3d at 1383.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 1383-84.
60. The only other "evidence" of anticompetitive effect offered by RA was an alleged
price-fixing agreement among BEI physicians who perform radial keratotomies. Id. at

1384. The district court rejected this argument because the alleged price-fixing was
unrelated to the restraint at issue in this action. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.

63. Id.
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Plaintiff's section 2 claim against its direct competitor, FRI, suffered
a similar fate. The district court first held that the record failed to
establish that FRI engaged in any anticompetitive conduct, which is an
While plaintiff
essential element of a section 2 attempt claim.'
suggested that FRI's participation in the alleged group boycott evidenced
predatory conduct, the district court's grant of summary judgment on
plaintiff's section 1 claim gutted this section 2 argument.' The district
court also held that there was no evidence of a specific intent by FRI to
monopolize the retina services market by joining BEI. Indeed, the
evidence to the contrary showed that FRI was initially reluctant to join
BEI and that FRI was willing to share the BEI referrals if RA subsequently joined the venture.6 7 Moreover, according to plaintiff, FRI's
agreement with BEI at most affected only fifteen percent of the relevant
market, far short of the market share necessary to evidence an intent to
Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment
monopolize."
against plaintiff on the section 2 claim as well.69
United States v. EngelhardCorp.
United States v. Engelhard Corp.7" concerned the Government's
unsuccessful effort to enjoin Engelhard Corporation's acquisition of
certain assets of Floridin Corporation. Engelhard and Floridin were the
two largest domestic producers and distributors of gel quality attapulgite
clay ("GQA").71 GQA is a form of clay found throughout the world;
however, "[in the United States it is found only along the GeorgiaFlorida border."" GQA is used as a thickening and suspension agent
in a variety of industrial products, such as suspension fertilizer, animal
feeds, paints, and asphalt roof-coatings.73 Prior to the acquisition, the
GQA business was very concentrated with Engelhard and Floridin each
B.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1385.
67. Id.
68. Id. This evidence also calls into question plaintiffs ability to prove a dangerous
probability of successfully monopolizing the relevant market-the third element of an
attempt claim. See U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 1001 (11th Cir.
1993) ("[Wihen the defendant possesses less than 50% of the market ... there [is] no
dangerous probability of success.., as a matter of law.").
69. 105 F.3d at 1385.
70. 126 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 1997).
71. Id. at 1303.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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holding over forty percent of the United States market and a third
company holding fifteen percent.74
Floridin's parent company decided to exit the GQA business and
offered to sell Floridin's assets.7 Engelhard expressed an interest in
acquiring Floridin's assets, largely to acquire Floridin's more modem
processing plant in Quincy, Florida."6 In an attempt to avoid antitrust
problems with the transaction, the parties structured the deal so that
Engelhard would not purchase Floridin's GQA business." Instead, the
plan was to have a third party, ITC Corporation, acquire Floridin's GQA
business; Engelhard and ITC would enter into a joint venture to share
the Quincy processing plant, otherwise competing independently as GQA
distributors of the clay processed at the Quincy plant.7"
The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice
nonetheless challenged the transaction, arguing that it would substantially lessen competition in the GQA market in violation of section 2 of
the Clayton Act.7 Following a three-week bench trial, the district
court rejected the Government's motion to enjoin the transaction.80
Specifically, the district court held that the Government failed to
establish its proposed relevant product market.8 "
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 2 The court initially rejected the
Government's contention that the district court improperly refused to
apply the approach to product market definition set forth in the 1992
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (the "Guidelines").s3 Under the Guidelines, the
relevant product market is determined by evaluating the substitutes, if
any, to which a customer would switch in response to a "'small but
significant and nontransitory price increase' in the product in question,"
which the enforcement agencies generally define as a five percent price
increase.8' Without addressing the appropriateness of the Guidelines'

74. Id.
75. Id. at 1304.

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id

80. United States v. Engelhard Corp., 970 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
81. Id.
82. Engelhard, 126 F.2d at 1308. The Eleventh Circuit refused to enter a stay pending
appeal. Id. at 1304. By the time of the decision, the transaction had been consummated.

Id.
83. Id. at 1304. The Guidelines are reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104
(Apr. 2, 1992).
84. 126 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines

§§ 1.0, 1.11).
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approach to product market definition, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
the district court did not base its decision on a rejection of this approach.85 The Eleventh Circuit explained that "[diespite the Government's protestations to the contrary, this case does not touch on broad
antitrust principles, but instead turns on a simple question asked in
every civil case-whether the plaintiff carried its burden of proof."'
Turning to the evidence, the court held that the district court's factual
determinations concerning the relevant product market were not clearly
erroneous, the deferential appellate review standard applicable here."7
Rather, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that "the
Government's methodology for determining the relevant product market,
as applied in this case, was flawed."8 Specifically, the court faulted
the Government for failing to ascertain the size of the GQA market,
which would have allowed the district court to appreciate whether the
customers on which the Government relied for its evidence were
representative of the GQA market generally.8 9 Moreover, the court
questioned the Government's failure to consider and present evidence
concerning the effect, if any, that competition among industrial thickness
and suspension agents, such as GQA, prior to the time an ingredient is
chosen for a particular formulation would have on overall prices for
those agents. ° The court correctly noted that while a GQA price
increase might have little effect in causing GQA consumers to reformulate their end-use products when a product already has been produced
using a particular agent, the effect of a price increase on consumers at
the preformulation state-at which switching costs are low if they exist
at all-might prevent an exercise of monopoly power by Engelhard."'
The Government's failure to consider this market factor called the
reliability of its evidence into question and justified the district court's
rejection of the Government's evidence.9 Because the district court did
not clearly err in finding that the Government failed to carry its burden
of proof on the factual issue of the definition of the relevant product
market, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court judgment."3

85. Id. at 1304-05.
86. Id. at 1305.
87. Id. at 1305-08.
88. Id. at 1307.
89. Id. at 1306.
90. Id. at 1306-07.
91. Id. at 1307.
92. Id. at 1307-08.
93. Id. at 1308.
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CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit's antitrust workload in 1997 continued the
pattern of at least the last ten years. It was light, fairly routine, and
generally not good for plaintiffs, including the Antitrust Division. We
do not anticipate any material changes in this trend for the foreseeable
future.4

94. Indeed, as we predicted last year, the Supreme Court in 1997 reversed prior
precedent and held that vertically imposed maximum retail price maintenance is not per
se unlawful. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997).

